Centro de Documentação da PJ
Monografia
 CD215 |
Terrorism and the electric power delivery system [Documento electrónico] / Committee on Enhancing the Robustness and Resilience of Future Electrical Transmission and Distribution in the United States to Terrorist Attack.- Washington, DC : National Academies Press, 2012.- 1 CD-ROM ; 12 cm
Ficheiro de 5,90 MB em formato PDF (164 p.).
ISBN 978-0-309-11404-2
TERRORISMO, ENERGIA ELÉCTRICA, ESTADOS UNIDOS
Summary. The nature of the problem. Physical vulnerability. Cyber vulnerability. Personnel vulnerability. Reducing risks. Reduce vulnerability. Expedite restoration,. Reduce vulnerability of critical services in the event of outages. The Importance of investment in research. What should the Department of Homeland Security do? 1 The electric transmission and distribution system as a terrorist target. The electric power system and its vulnerability. Non-malicious threats to the electricity delivery system. Potential attacks on the electric power system. Precedents for attacks on power systems. Impacts of widespread, long-lasting blackouts. Actions taken so far to reduce vulnerability. Actions by the utility industry. Actions by Government. Conclusions. References. 2 The electric power system today. The power delivery system. Overview description. Regional differences among electric power systems in the United States. Operations and standards. Electric power industry institutions and organizations. Implications for system reliability of an industry in transition. Structural changes in the industry. Industry practice—normal planning and operations. Long-range planning. Incentives for transmission and distribution facility investment. Conclusions. References. 3 Physical security considerations for electric power systems. The threat. Power system choke points and vulnerabilities. Points of vulnerability. Countermeasures. Repair and restoration. Consequence management. Post 9/11 power industry physical security enhancements. Conclusions. References. 4 Vulnerabilities of systems for sensing, communication, and control. Sensing, communication, and control subsystems. Functions of sensing, communication, and control elements of a typical power system. Threats and risk. Toward secure systems for sensing, communication, and control. Conclusions. Bibliography. 5 Vulnerabilities related to the people who run the electric power system. Security threats from insiders. Planning, training, and rehearsal. Preparatory activities. First responders. Errors and automation. Aging workforce, recruiting, and training. Workforce vulnerability to pandemics. Conclusions. References. 6 Mitigating the impact of attacks on the power system. Bulk power system engineering. Substation design and modernization. Power system protective relaying. Sensors. Automatic controls for power systems. Power system operations and energy management systems. Distribution engineering. Distributed generation/energy sources. Findings and recommendations. Findings. Recommendations. Bibliography. 7 Restoration of the electric power system after an attack. Planning for the aftermath of a terrorist attack. Ensuring access to physical equipment for restoration. Organizing for restoration. Coordination of essential services. Crisis communication. Partnering for mutual assistance. Additional special considerations. Testing for restoration—drills. Restoration considerations. Service restoration. Black-start equipment. Restoring damaged infrastructure. Communications with the public. Findings and recommendations. Findings. Recommendations. References. 8 Strategies for securing crucial services and critical infrastructure. In the event of an extended power outage. The need for planning for outages. Strategies for securing crucial services. Assessing and mitigating vulnerabilities. Improving the reliability of services. The importance of federal leadership. Findings and recommendations. Finding. Recommendations. References. 9 Research and development needs for the electric power delivery system. R&D for meeting three broad goals. Thwarting attacks. Reducing vulnerability to attacks. Reducing the impact of an attack. Major technology areas for reducing vulnerability to natural disasters and terrorist attacks. Technologies that allow significant increases in power flow. Equipment that allows greater control of energy flows. Advanced monitoring and communications equipment. Technologies that enable increased asset utilization. Technologies that are particularly intended to enhance security. Technologies that enable greater connectivity and control. Technologies to reduce demand on the power system. Distributed energy resources and power technologies. R&D priorities. How much research? Funding research and development. Current situation and challenges. A possible path forward. Alternative views of how power systems could evolve. The decentralized approach. The centralized approach. Findings and recommendations. Findings. Recommendations for R&D to reduce vulnerability to terrorism. References. 10 Recommendations. Specific recommendations for the Department of Homeland Security. Additional recommendations. Additional recommendations primarily for active participation by DHS. Recommendations primarily for utilities, system operators, and law enforcement. Recommendations primarily for Congress and/or State legislatures. Recommendations primarily for standards-setting groups. Recommendations primarily for State Government, Regions, and Communities. Recommendations primarily for DOE, EPRI, and other research organizations. APPENDIXES: A statement of task. B Committee biographical information. C List of presentations and committee meetings. D Acronyms. E Summary of NERC Cyber Security Standards. F Substation configurations. G Controlling power systems. H R&D needs for the power delivery system.