Centro de Documentação da PJ
Analítico de Periódico
CD 368
Disinformation as a service [Recurso eletrónico] : the emerging high-risk criminal networks of ‘influence’ operators / Zaur Gouliev
European Law Enforcement Research Bulletin, Luxembourg, Special conference (Edition n. 7, 2026), p. 125-144
Edição especial da conferência n.º 7 da “CEPOL R&S Conference 2024/2025”, subordinada ao tema “Tackling the World of High-Risk Criminal Networks (HRCN)", que teve lugar em Ostia (Roma), nos dias 25 a 27 de março de 2025.
DESINFORMAÇÃO, REDE CRIMINOSA, CRIME INFORMÁTICO, INTERNET, ELEIÇÃO
Disinformation is no longer confined to state propaganda or isolated online actors; it has become a commodified criminal service. Networks of influence operators now offer disinformation as a service, executing campaigns for paying clients, including state actors and private entities, in the same manner as cybercrime-for-hire schemes. This convergence of disinformation, cybercrime and organised criminal structures constitutes a major internal security threat. These hybrid operations blur the distinction between state-backed activity and criminal enterprise, complicating attribution, disruption and prosecution. In effect, disinformation has become an underworld commodity, one that exploits the reach of global digital infrastructure to manipulate public opinion at scale. This study examines disinformation as a service through a multilayered methodology combining three lines of evidence. First, a case study of the ‘Doppelganger’ campaign shows how state-linked operators assembled and maintained a large-scale disinformation network using cloned media sites, ad-tracking software and bulletproof hosting. Second, a market-based supply analysis of over 25 Surface Web and 15 Dark Web marketplaces identifies the retail ecosystem behind influence for hire, documenting the sale of engagement, narrative amplification and targeting services. Third, a macro-level analysis shows the wider landscape of foreign information manipulation and interference within the context of elections. We map actor trends, attack patterns and evolving tactics. The findings reveal a mature criminal ecosystem in which influence operations are traded as modular services, supported by technical infrastructure borrowed from cybercrime markets. The article concludes by assessing the implications for European law enforcement.
