PP958
Analítico de Periódico
ELDAR, Ofer
Can lax corporate law increase shareholder value? : evidence from Nevada / Ofer Eldar
The Journal of Law & Economics, Chicago, v.61 n.4 (November 2018), p.555-605
DIREITO COMERCIAL / EUA, DIREITO DAS SOCIEDADES / EUA, ADMINISTRADOR DE SOCIEDADES / EUA, TAKEOVER / EUA, LITÍGIOS / EUA, ACCIONISTA / EUA
Recent scholarship argues that Nevada’s lax corporate law, which exempts managers from fiduciary duties and discourages takeovers, may harm shareholder wealth. I present evidence that Nevada corporate law does not harm shareholder value for firms that self-select into Nevada, particularly small firms with low institutional shareholding and high insider ownership, and it may in fact enhance the value of these firms. A possible explanation is that Nevada’s pro-managerial laws reduce the likelihood of takeovers and litigation, thereby benefiting a segment of small firms for which the costs of corporate governance may outweigh the benefits.